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Mortgage Guarantee Insurance (MGI) provides protection to lenders against default by
borrowers who have less than 20 percent equity interest in the mortgaged property. The
existence ofthis form ofinsurance helps to stimulate home ownership by allowing consumers
with less than twenty percent down payment access to credit markets. Initially an invention
of lenders, MGI became dominated by government agencies after the Great Depression but
recently private insurers have increased their market share to more than 75 percent. The
domination ofthe industry by the private sector appears not to affirm competition, however.
Despite varying loss ratios across states, MGI premiums appear to remain relatively uniform,
suggesting price inflexibility. This paper uses cross-sectional data on loss ratio, mortgage
delinquency rates, and housing prices to test empirically the level of competition in the MGI
industry. The paper finds that the level of competition in the industry is not sufficient to
drive the premiums to the competitive (efficient) level. The implication is that national cross
subsidies occur where high risk insureds are subsidized by low risk insureds.
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Introduction
The introduction ofmortgage guarantee insurance(MGI) was one ofthe government
policies instituted in the 1930s to promotehome ownership in the US (Sellon (1990)). MGI
reduces the lenders’ risk and exposure to default ofresidential mortgage holders with less than 20
percent equity interest in theproperty. This reducesthe moral hazard which mayexistwhen the
mortgagee does not stand to lose muchin theway ofequity in the event ofdefault. The
premiums arepaid by the insured (the mortgagee), whiletheloss-payee is the mortgage holder.
Both homeowners with insufficient down payment for standardfinancing, and mortgage
companies who faced reducedexposure to default benefit from MGI. The expansion ofthe
private sectorin MGI seems to suggest increasing competition in the industry. Uniformity in
MGI premiums acrossstates with widelyvarying default rates seems to indicate that competition
maybe limited. This paper tests empiricallywhetherthe industry is efficientby lookingatcross-
sectional dataon mortgage delinquency rates,MGI premiums, housing prices, and insurance loss
ratio.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 gives a briefhistory ofthe industry and
outlines the issue, section 2 provides a description ofthe MGI industry, section 3 discusses the
empirical investigation and section 4 provides theresult. Section 5 is a discussion ofthe
implications ofthe findings and Section 6 concludes.
11 The Issue
Thefirst incarnation ofthe mortgage guarantee industry in the United States occurred in
NewYork state in 1885 whenfirms were allowedto include coverage ofpayment alongwith title
insurance. The industry expanded and peaked in 1930 then collapsed with the wholesale defaults
and bankruptcies which occurredduring theDepression. The second incarnation,in 1937, was in
the form ofthe FederalHousing Administration’s (FHA) loan guarantee. The industry remained
primarilygovernment sponsoreduntil 1957 when theMortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation
(MGIC) was charteredunder Wisconsin’s statelaws. Since this third incarnation, private
mortgage insurance has expanded and now holds the lion’s share ofthe market. The industry has
evolvedsignificantly alongthe wayand canbe creditedwith bolstering the Savings and Loan
industry and stimulating home ownership. Graaskamp (1967) and Browne (1979) provide good
summariesofthe evolution oftheindustry. Sellon (1990) credits MGI as one ofthe tools used
by the U.S. government to stimulate home ownership.
With the increasing market share ofprivate mortgage insurancecompanies, one might
conclude that the industryis efficient, orat leastmoving in the direction ofperfect competition.
Yet MGI premiums appearto be relatively uniformat the national level. The mortgage guarantee
insurance (MGI) business is characterizedby large lossfluctuations in the aggregate level in both
cross sectional and historical dimensions. As shown in figure 1, state level loss ratiosbetween
1984 and 1996 vary from less than 10 percent in Guam to almost 90 percent in California and
New Hampshire. This wide discrepancies in underwriting experience appears to exist over a
long period oftime. According to datafrom theMissouri Department ofInsurance, forall MGI
companies writingin this line ofbusiness in Missouri, theirloss ratios from 1970 to 1995 are
269.2%nation-wide and 31.7% in Missouri.
Inspite ofthe largevariations in loss experience, most insurancecompanies apply a
uniformfee schedule to all customers in all states except Pennsylvania and South Carolina. This
unusual rate uniformity has been challengedby insurance regulators suchas formerWyoming
commissioner Langdon. Insurers argue that a variedrate will cause more consumers to be
rejectedby mortgage lenders and therefore limit mortgage availability. They also defend their
rate schedules by the variations in demandfactors across states.1
Figure 1: MGI Loss ratioby state
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is understandable that a lower uniformrate will
hamperinsurance availability to certainhigh risk
consumers. For example, consider the expected loss
distribution ofpolicies ofstate BR as shown in curve
CDE in figure 2. Ifpremium is set at OB, only
State OR consumers with an expected loss no morethan OB
0 C Frequency can obtain coverage. Suppose premium is set at level
Figure 2 Expected Loss Distribution OA than mortgage borrowers with an expected loss ForStates A and B
between OA and OB, areaABDE, can also obtain
coverage. The question is: if theprevailing rateis at level OA, whyotherinsurers do not try to
charge rate OB to compete forthe less risky customers in areaBDCO. In addition, given that the
average customers in state GR are moreprofitable than in state BR, why insurersdo not set a
slightly lower rate in stateGR to compete forthe business in state GR.
Ofcourse, one can arguethat variations in the underwritingexperience are due
exclusively to unpredictable variations in MGI losses. Forexample, Spahrand Escolas (1990)
argue that MGI losses areparticularly difficult to predict because ofthe correlationamong
different policies in the cross-sectional level. So far there is no formal study on thepredictability
ofmortgage insurancelosses. We explore this issue in this paper. Since individual level datais
countrywide average. The insurersargue that Langdon failto consider non-insurance factors suchas,
Detroitdemandmortgage guarantyinsurance for insuranceagainstmortgage defaultswhereas Wyoming,
because ofits greater need for external capital, demands mortgage guarantyinsuranceforthe marketability
ofmortgages in the secondary markets. The court ruled in favor ofthe insurer.
4
BRnot available to us,we only explore the predictable components ofloss variations in the state
level. Suppose a significant portionofthe state level loss variations is predictable, a failure of
the premiums to trackthesepredictable losscomponents should suggest a lackofcompetition in
this market.
2 ABrief Overview oftheMortgage Guarantee InsuranceMarkets
Table 1 shows themarket share distribution ofthe 10 largestMGI insurers in 1995. Note
that this is a highlyconcentrated market with the top five insurers constitutedmore than 90
percent ofthe market share. As collusion is more likely in a concentrated market, andithas also
been suggested that colluding companies are more likely to maintain stablemarket shares . We
plotthe market shares ofthe top eleven groups ofmortgage insurers since 1984 in figures 3, 4,
and 5. There is no evidencethat market shares are stable over time.
The market powerof theMGI insurers is also contested by the presenceofclose
substitutesand thepotential ofentry. Mortgage loans can also be insured by FederalHousing
Administration, Veterans Administration, State mortgage insurancefunds in a few statessuch as
California, and lenderself insurance. According to Blood (pp. 658), lender selfinsurance
accounted forover 50 percent ofthe market in 1988 and early 1989.
The entrycost varies from stateto state. Thecommon requirement is in the
neighborhood of 1 million ofequity capital and another 1 millionofpaid-in surplus. Most
residentialmortgage insurers also use a salaried street sales force. These appearto be modest
barriers to entry, especiallyforotherlarge property and casualty insurance companies. Thereis
also no obvious reason to expect that exit is costly. In sum, assuming complete market
information, this appears to be a contestable market.
5Information in this market, however, is particularly fragmented. Insurance pricingis
complicated and confusing forconsumers. The mortgage insurancerates depend on factors
including the amount ofcoverage and the loan to value ratio. Borrower type is only usedfor
underwriting decision, Includingborrowertype as a ratingvariable certainlycomplicates the
matter. Theindirect contactbetweenmortgage insurers and mortgage borrowers further
complicates thetransaction. MGI companies usuallyopen a masteraccount with a lender and
deal with thelenderdirectly. Mortgageborrowers frequently do not know the names ofthe
insurers, let alone how to compare theirprices. They simplyrely on lenders’ advice or let the
mortgage lenders choose the insurer forthem.
For MGI insurers, their informationabout mortgage borrowers is imperfect and less
completethan mortgage lenders. Mortgage lenders, especiallyin the early days ofthe MGI
business, have more dataabout theircustomers becausetheyhave been in the business for a
longer time than the insurers. They have moreinformation aboutthe mortgage borrowers
because they have direct contact with their customers. The reliance ofinsurers on lenders for
borrowerinformation is evidencedby the common practice ofdelegated underwritingby insurers
to lenders (Blood, pp. 646). Some MGI companies appearto concentrate theirmonitoring effort
on the lenders only.
In sum, ifinformation is complete, this appears to be a contestablemarket. However,
information is far from completein either the buyer orthe seller side. Whether this is a
contestable market becomes an empirical question. In the following, we investigatethis issue by
studying whether variations in thestate level MGI business profitability (orloss ratio) are
predictable.
63 Empirical Estimation
To investigate whetherstate level premium variations successfullytrackpredictable
losses,we perform leastsquare regressionsof 1996 loss ratios on several variables that we expect
to be determinants ofor contain information aboutloss ratio. The loss ratiois a ubiquitous
measure in the insurance literature. Not only is itfrequently used as a measureofprofitability,
theoretically,it has also been arguedthat theinverseofthe loss ratio is theprice ofinsurance.
Supposethere is perfect competition, weexpect theexpected profit to be zero in all states.
Hence,ifwe assume that expectations based on existing information is on average accurate (i.e.
agents have rational expectations),loss ratio should not be associated with any variablethat was
knownwhen thepremium rates were set.
The independentvariables are the standard deviation ofannual housing pricebetween
1979 and 1992, theaverage delinquencyrate ofconventional mortgage loans from 1979 to 1991,
the standarddeviation ofthe aforementioned delinquency rate from 1979 to 1991 (making it
1979 to 1992 does not have a significant effect on theresults), the past lossratio (loss ratio
between 1984 and 1991), thecommission and brokerage expense as a percentage ofearned
premium, and the tax and licensing expense asa percentageofearnedpremium. Defaults of
mortgage loans usually happen in the first two to three years. Consequently, losses in 1995 and
1996 arenot likely to be caused by housing price fluctuations which occurredprior to 1992. We
also use loss ratios and delinquency rates prior to 1992 to ensure that there is enough time for
insurers to react to this information.
The total mortgage insurance losses canbe decomposed into loss frequency and loss
severity. Past mortgage delinquencyrates should provide some information about futureloss
7frequency. States with more volatile business orhousing business cycles are likely to have more
delinquencyrate fluctuations. We therefore include both the average and the standard deviation
ofthe delinquencyrate as separate independentvariables.
Loss severity, and also loss frequency, should be affectedby thefluctuations in housing
prices. The average ofthe standarddeviations ofhousing price in major metropolitan areas for
each state is usedto capture the degree offluctuations in housing price. Regressions use the data
oftwentyfive states as described in Appendix I. Figures 6 and 7 plotthe loss ratios, housing
price standard deviations and mortgage delinquency rates for thesetwenty five states. Note the
strong association between housing pricestandard deviation and loss ratio.
As a higher operating cost requires a higherpriceto breakeven, the commission and
brokerage expense rateand the license and tax expenserateare included as independent
variables. In addition, past lossratio is included as an independentvariable to explorehow
companies adjusttheirunderwriting guidelines according to their past underwriting experience.
An appropriate adjustment ofpremium should causeloss ratio to be independentofany past
information. A significant coefficient may suggest that adjustments ofpremiums according to
past lossesdo not adequatelytrackexpected losses.
Dueto the law oflarge number, states with largerbusiness volumes should have smaller
loss ratiovariations. As a consequence, we useweighted least square regressions. The weight
usedis the square root ofthe earned premium. One wayto interpret the loss ratiois that it is the
average realized loss per unit ofinsurancecoverage (which canbe approximatedby premium
divided by an expense multiplier as suggested in Pauly, Kleindorferand Kunreuther (1986))
purchased.
84 Results
The results arereported in table 2. Both the standard deviation ofhousing prices and the
standard deviationofthe delinquency rateentersignificantly, indicating that the fluctuations in
thehousing price have a significant effect on the loss ratioofresidential mortgage guarantee
insurance. The impactofhousing price fluctuationon lossratio is particularlypronounced.
Increasing thestandard deviation ofhousing priceby one standard deviation increasesthe 1996
loss ratioby 0.242, which is 19 percent less than one standarddeviation ofthe lossratio.
The standard deviationofthe delinquency rate is significantwhereas the average default
rate is not. These two variables appearto be highly correlatedbecause excluding either one
makes theother one muchmore significant. Excluding the standard deviation makes the average
delinquencyrate significantat the 5 percent level. This is actually not surprising because the
standarddeviation ofthe delinquencyrate is likely to embodyboth information about the
volatility ofthe housing cycles as well as the level ofaverage delinquencyrate. The results
suggest that increasing thestandard deviation ofthe delinquency rate by one standard deviation
willincrease the 1996 loss ratioby0.077, which is about 26 percent ofits standard deviation.
The past loss ratiocoefficient is negative and statistically significant, indicating that
insurers adjust theirunderwritingcriteriaaccording to past underwritingexperience. An ideal
adjustment, however, should cause the loss ratioto be independentofall information available
for pricesetting. A negative coefficient suggests two possibilities. First, premium does not
adjustcompletely according to expected loss. Second, insurers do not ordo not only rely on
statistical data. Forexample, they also form long termrelationship with lenders, relyon lenders
to screenthe customers, and design underwriting guidelines partially to punish lenders with poor
9underwritingperformance.
The othervariables areinsignificant and ofthe expected sign except forthe commission
and brokerage expense which is ofthe wrong sign. The wrong sign couldbe because
commission and brokerageexpense and tax and licensing expense dataare available only since
1995. We also find that several companies reportedzero commission and brokerage expensein
several stateseven though they have a large amount ofearnedpremium in those states. It is
possible that sales incentives, bonuses oreven expenses paid to their salaried sales force may not
be reportedby companies. Legal issues maycause insurers to avoidreporting theirexpenses in
this area. It maybe illegal for lenders to accept kickbacksand even ifthey are not illegal, lenders
maywant to avoidreleasing this kind ofinformation simplybecause ofthe possibility for
kickbacks to become illegal one day as in otherbusinesses such as the residentialreal estate
brokerage in a certain periodoftime. Hence, the commission and brokerageexpense datais not
necessarily an accuratemeasure ofsales expense.
The coefficients forhousing price standard deviation and default frequency standard
deviation appear to be quiterobust. When past lost ratio, tax and licensing expense, and
commission and brokerageexpense areexcluded from theregression equation, the coefficients of
thesetwo variables remain statistically significant and are somewhat larger. In addition, similar
results are found when 1995, 1994, or 1993 loss ratios areused as the dependent variable.
S Discussion
Theresults ofthis study indicatethat state level loss-ratio variations in mortgage
guaranteeinsurancehave a strong correlation with housing pricefluctuations and past
delinquencyrate fluctuations, especiallythe former. Thesheer magnitudes oftheserelationships,
10in addition to theirstatistical significance, suggest that there is insufficient pricecompetition in
this market. Premiums fail to tracklosses in a large scale.
One possible reason is that expenses maybe inverselyrelated to the mortgage insurance
losses. Mortgage lendersfrequently havetheirown licensed mortgage insurance agents and
therefore canlegally accept commission from the mortgage insurers. Onecan see the
conmiission as the priceinsurers pay to the lendersfortheirpolicies. Rigorous competition
should drive this pricelevel to the net presentvalues ofthe policies.
Ifthat is the case, however, weexpect thecommission expense ofinsurers to account for
at leastthebulkofthe lossratio differentials. Unfortunately, the commission and brokerage
expense ratiovariable is insignificant. Ofcourse, it is possible that this is causedby the
inaccuracies ofthe commission and brokerageexpense dataas discussedbefore.
Suppose mortgage insurers did pass theirabnormal profitto the lenders through some
kind ofcommission or sales incentive, mortgage lending in states with lower loss ratios should
be more profitable. Ifthe mortgage market is competitive then we expect lenders to pass their
additional income from MGI business to theircustomers through a lower initial fee orlower
mortgage interest rate. Weperform a regression ofthe statelevel initial fee to loan ratioon
mortgage loss ratio. The loss ratioturns out to be statistically insignificant. Since lenders
usually quotethe same mortgage interest rates independentofthe loan-to-valueratio whereas the
initial fees areusually professedto be negotiable, it seems that theonly fairwayofpassing
lenders’ additional income from MGI business back to customers should be through the initial
fees. Customers making more than 20 percent ofdown payment do not need mortgage insurance
and therefore should not share in the “savings.” We nonetheless also regress the effective
11mortgage interest rate on theMGI loss ratio. The loss ratioonce again turns out to be statistically
insignificant.
Another possibility is that insurers do not have completecontrol ofthe underwriting
criteria and therefore cannotrelycompletely on theirobjective expectation offuture losses to set
thepremium rates. They insteadrelyon lendersto screencustomers and use some kind of
incentive system to control profit such as sharing short run lossand profit fluctuations with
lenders. The incentiveto set a statisticallyfair premium rate maybe lacking in this industry
because asinsurers haveto rely on lenders to screencustomers, setting a lower rateand therefore
paying lenders a lower “price” forcustomers may causethe insurer to receive only theworst risks
among eachrisk category from the lenders. Inany event, it is still not clear where this payment
forcustomers ends up.
6 Conclusion
In sum, theresults ofthis study indicatethat competition in the MGI market fails to drive
price to its competitive level in all states. In addition, there is also no statistical evidence that
additional profits are beingpassedback to consumers. Some insurers suggest that a higher
insurancerate helpto increase the availability ofmortgage loans to consumers. This is clearly a
very controversial opinion,ifnot wrong.
A uniformratecan mean that insurers aremaking positive economic profits in certain
states. Or, suppose insurers breakeven, a uniformrate schedule implies that good risks are
subsidizing bad risks. Though this arbitrarycross subsidizing improves mortgage availability or
affordability forthe bad risks, it certainlyhampers mortgage loan affordability forthe good risks.
As a higher pricedecreases quantity demanded by the good risks, it may actuallyhave a negative
12net aggregate effect on home purchasing. In addition, it arbitrarilytransfers wealthfrom the
good risksto otherparties.
Indeed,considering the negative effects ofdefault on a mortgage borrower’s credit
history, thebenefit ofthe availability ofmortgage loan is also not clear. Though one can argue
that a bad risk would not make amortgage loan knowing that the expected benefit is negative,
asymmetricinformation in this market may imply that the borrowerhas a less accurate self-risk
assessment than the lender. Theborrower mayhave more personal information, but the lender
should havemore information about theprospect ofthe market as well as statistics aboutthe
chance ofdefault ofindividual borrowertypes.
Anexamination ofthe market structure, however, suggests that this should be a
reasonably competitive market ifthereis enough information flow. The flowofinformation
between customers and insurers is filtered through lenders. It is possible that insurers’ ability to
set priceexclusively according to expected loss is hampered bythe indirectnatureofthe
information flow process. As the cost ofinformationgathering is declining over time, the
efficiency gain ofusing lender’s information instead ofsoliciting information and selling to
mortgage borrowers directly mayhave dwindled. Hence,this maybe time to mandate lenders to
lend to all borrowers with a certain level ofMGI insurance and pave way fordirect marketing in
this line ofinsurance business. Lendersare similar to independentagents in the property-liability
insurance business. Insurers using independent agents are known to have a substantiallyhigher
commission expense to premium ratio than insurers using direct marketing or captive agents.
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General Electric 640,592,431 30.81 30.81
Mortgage Guaranty Corp S/G 492,295,245 23.68 54.49
AllState InsuranceGroup 336,720,087 16.20 70.69
American International Group 235,324,894 11.32 82.01
Old Republic Group 170,271,570 8.19 90.20
CMAC Group 139,469,073 6.71 96.91
Amerin Group 34,337,883 1.65 98.56
Collateral Mortgage Group 18,889,934 0.91 99.47
Travelers Insurance Group 5,166,415 0.25 99.72
Policyholders Benefit Corp. 1,866,126 0.09 99.81
Total 2,078,940,768 100 100
Source: National Association ofInsurance Commissioners, “1995 Market Share Reports for
Property/Casualty Groups andCompanies.”
Table 2 Weighted LS Regression Results (1996 Loss Ratio is theDependent VariableY’
Independent Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Mean (Standard Dev.)
Intercept 1.26 (0.494)
Housing Price Standard Deviation 0.0202 (0.00276) 16.01 (11.95)
DefaultRate StandardDeviation 0.272 (0.144) 0.00911 (0.00282)
Average DefaultRate 0.00768 (0.0879) 0.0329 (0.00647)
Pass Loss Ratio -2.24 (0.536) 0.429 (0.063)
License Tax Expense Rate -18.1 (11.9) 0.0238 (0.000425)
CommissionBrokerage Exp. Rate -3.49 (26.5) 0.00198 (0.00129)
R-Square 0.528
a. The mean and standard deviation ofthe dependent variable (loss ratio) are 0.424 and 0.298.
16Appendix I Data
The state level mortgage guarantyinsurance datacomes from theNational Association of
Insurance Conmfissioners (NAIC). In 1992, line six wasadded to the state page ofthe annual
statement filed with the NAIC to report MGI business. Prior to 1992, total business ofa
company reported in line 32 ofthe statepage ofthe annual statementis usedto calculate theMGI
experience dataforthe following companies:
Commonwealth Mortgage Assurance Company,CMG Mortgage Insurance Company,
GuarantyNational Insurance Company ofCalifornia, General Electric Home Equity
Insurance CorporationofNorth Carolina, General Electric Mortgage Insurance
Corporation, General Electric Mortgage Insurance CorporationofNorth Carolina,
General Electric Residential Mortgage Insurance Corp. OfNorthCarolina, Home
Guaranty Insurance Corporation, Investors Equity Insurance Company Inc., Mortgage
Guaranty Insurance Corp., PMI Mortgage Insurance Company, Policy Holders Benefit
Corporation, Republic MortgageInsurance Company,Triad GuarantyInsurance Corp.,
United Guaranty Credit Insurance Company,United Guaranty Residential Insurance
Company, UnitedGuaranty Residential Insurance Corp. ofNorthCarolina, Verex
Assurance Inc., WMAC Credit Insurance Corp.
These are all the MGI companies file with NAIC between 1992 and 1996. They include the
largest mortgage insurers in thelast two decades.
The loss ratio is calculatedfrom the total premium earned and loss incurred. The MGI
premium and loss datafrom the NAIC database include the total numbers forboth commercial
and residentiallines. The commercial line, however, is a relatively small component. Mortgage
17insurers arerequired to reporttheir countrywide and Missouri underwriting experience in both
commercial and residentiallines to the Missouri Department ofInsurance. According to data
from the Missouri Department ofInsurance,for all themortgage insurers licensed in Missouri,
theirtotal commercial premium earned countrywide for the past twenty six years is less than one
percent ofthetotal mortgage insurance premiums earned countrywide. Though commercial
mortgage guarantybusiness has fluctuatedover time, forall insurers licensed in Missouri, the
share ofcommercial MGI premiums neverexceeded 3 percent ofthe total MGI premiums. We
furthercurtail the noises from the commercial MGI premiums by excluding the premium and
loss dataof threeofthe biggest commercial mortgage insurers from the premium and loss data
usedin this study.
The housing price datais from the National Association ofRealtors.2 They are the
medium price ofexisting housing by metropolitan statistical areaforthe years 1979 to 1992.
Sincethe datafor some metropolitan areasare not continuous, they areexcluded. Only twenty
five stateswith thelongest continuous dataseries areretained. The housing pricestandard
deviation foreach stateusedis the average housing pricestandard deviation ofthe following
metropolitan areas and states. Note that if we use only the figures for stateswith a continuous
housing priceseries from 1979 to 1992, only 15 states will be left. Nonetheless,the regression
results are similar when this smaller sample is used.
States and metropolitan areas with housing pricedatafrom 1979 to 1992:
Alabama (Birmingham), California (Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco Bay Area,
2The ChamberofCommerce also surveys and publishes housing price dataformetropolitan areas
in theirACCRA Report. Unfortunately, the ACCRA housing price series are also frequently not
continuous.
18Riverside/San Bernardino),Florida(Lauderdale/Hollywood/Pompano Beach, Tampa/St.
Petersburg/Clearwater), illinois (Chicago), Indiana (Indianapolis, Memphis), Michigan
(Detroit), Minnesota (Minneapolis/St. Paul), Missouri (Kansas City),New York
(Albany/Schenectady/Troy, Rochester), Ohio (Columbus), Rodhe Island (Providence),
Texas (Houston, San Antonio), Utah (SaltLake City), DC (Washington DC), Wisconsin
(Milwaukee).
States and metropolitan areaswith housing price datafrom 1980 to 1992:
California (Sacramento),Connecticut (Hardford), Iowa(Des Moines),Kentucky
(Louisville), Michigan (GrandRapids), New Mexico(Albuquerque), New York (New
York, Syracuse), Ohio (Akron),Oklahoma (Oklahoma, Tulsa), Tennessee
(Nashville/Davidson), Texas (El Paso).
Statesand metropolitan areaswith housing price datafrom 1981 to 1992:
California (Orange County), Florida (Orlando, West PalmBeach/Boca Raton/Delray
Beach),New York (New York),Oklahoma (OklahomaCity), Tennesse (Knoxville).
States and metropolitan areaswith housing price datafrom 1982 to 1992:
Colorado(Denver), Massachusett (Boston), Nebraska (Omaha), Missouri (St. Louis),
Texas (Dallas).
As for the mortgage delinquencyrates, the MortgageBankers Association surveys and
publishes mortgage delinquency ratesforconventional mortgage loans, VA mortgage loans, and
FHA loans quarterly since 1979. The standarddeviations and the averagesofthe delinquency
rates arethe standard deviations and averages ofthe quarterly series. In addition, the mortgage
interest rate and initial fee data are obtained from the Housing and Urban Development.
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